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Failed and Friendless – the UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ 
programme. 
Paul Thomas, University of Huddersfield, UK 
 
Abstract 
This article suggests that Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), the government’s 
‘hearts and minds’ response to the threat of domestic Islamist terrorism within the 
wider CONTEST strategy, has been exposed as both failed and friendless by 
growing political and academic scrutiny. PVE’s monocultural focus on Muslims is in 
stark contradiction to the overriding policy goal of community cohesion, whilst its 
implementation has provoked accusations both of surveillance and of engineering 
‘value changes’ within Muslim communities. Local conflicts relating to the 
operationalisation of PVE result from political disagreement over the balance 
between community engagement and policing within the Labour government, and 
these problems leave  the future of this key anti-terrorism policy area unclear. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 




 It is beyond dispute that the UK has faced a significant Islamist terrorist threat in 
recent years. The 7/7 bombings of July 2005, in which  56 people from  a variety of  
backgrounds died in four co-ordinated terrorist explosions on public transport, 
graphically illustrated this reality. The scale of the Islamist challenge has been 
subsequently confirmed by a number of uncovered plots, the failed attacks of 21st 
July 2005, and the attack on Glasgow airport in 2007. A particularly worrying element 
has been that most of those implicated have been Muslims resident, and often born, 
in Britain. This suggests that some young Muslims are dangerously alienated from 
British values, and from the respect for diversity and free speech that necessarily 
underpins Britain’s democratic, multicultural society (Prins and Salisbury, 2008). It 
might also be seen as confirming the analysis put forward after the violent 
disturbances in  Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001, all of which involved young 
Muslims, that much of Britain is profoundly ethnically segregated, with different 
ethnic communities leading ‘parallel lives’ and having little respect or trust for each 
other (Cantle, 2001). A key element of this analysis was that previous policy 
approaches of anti-racism and equal opportunities, whilst well-intentioned and 
having positive impacts on Britain’s substantial ethnic inequalities, had resulted in a 
concern for each separate ethnic group, rather than developing a focus on positive 
relations between communities, or on the over-arching identities intrinsic to such a 
focus (Cantle, 2005; Thomas, 2007). This perspective suggested that the focus on 
individual ethnic groups had further hardened separate, and potentially antagonistic, 
ethnic/religious identities to the detriment of commonality. This nuanced analysis 
was developed in to a wider attack on multiculturalism itself (Phillips, 2005), and on 
how it has apparently weakened Britain’s ability to oppose terrorism through its 
indulgence of ethnic separation (Prins and Salisbury, 2008).  
 
The Government’s overarching policy response since 2001 has been ‘Community 
Cohesion’ (Cantle, 2001; Home Office, 2005), the concern to promote cross-ethnic 
contact. Another key policy since the 7/7 bombings  has been the Preventing Violent 
Extremism (PVE)  agenda, a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to Muslim young people 
and their communities as part of the Government’s wider counter-terrorism 
CONTEST strategy (DCLG, 2007a; Home Office, 2009). It is PVE, often known as 
‘Prevent’, that provides the focus for this article. The article examines the 
development and implementation of PVE since its inception in 2006, and discusses 
its impact in relation to four key criticisms made by a number of commentators as 
this policy has unfolded (Thomas, 2009; Birt, 2009; Turley, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). 
These are that PVE has had an unhelpful and broad mononcultural focus on 
Muslims, that it has been a vehicle for a significant growth in state surveillance of 
Muslim communities, that PVE in the way it has been designed and implemented is 
contradictory to other key governmental priorities such as Community Cohesion, and 
that the problematic design of PVE has left progress hobbled by intra-governmental 
tensions at both national and local level. Each of these criticisms is outlined and 
discussed, drawing on academic material and on material submitted to and produced 
by the Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry in to PVE (House of Commons, 2009; 
2010). This enables the article to develop a discussion in conclusion around what 
this experience tells us about combating violent extremism in particular and, more 
broadly, about approaches to policy design, as well as suggesting how this policy 
agenda might develop in the future. 
  Here, the contention is that this flagship policy has been increasingly exposed as 
both failed and friendless.   To support this discussion, the article starts with a short 
summary of the PVE policy agenda and its operationalisation. 
 
 
Preventing Violent Extremism 
Whilst the announcement of the PVE programme in October 2006 (DCLG, 2007a) 
created the impression that it was simply a response to the terrorist events of July 
2005, Government had previously mapped out the key elements of the PVE strategy  
(FCO/Home Office, 2004), as well as identified key dilemmas over it that remain . 
This suggests that the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, the riots in northern England 
the same summer, and intelligence highlighting the involvement of British Muslims in 
Jihadist training camps in Afghanistan from the late 1990s onwards (Burke, 2007) 
had all combined to convince the Government that it had a significant Muslim 
problem in relation to attractions to violent extremism.  
An initial £6 million ‘Pathfinder’ , or pilot, fund for the 70 Local Authorities in England 
having Muslims as 5% or more of their populations was announced in 2007(DCLG, 
2007b); this was subsequently expanded significantly in 2008 as a three-year, £45 
million fund for all Local Authorities with 4,000 or more Muslims (Thomas, 2009). In 
parallel, further development came through significant funding to Youth Offending 
Teams through the Youth Justice Board, and to the Prison Service, both reflecting 
well-founded concerns that radicalisation of individual Muslims was taking place 
during incarceration (Warnes and Hannah, 2008). The important role played for 
radical Islamist political groups by Further and Higher Education settings also led to 
a funding focus on Universities and Colleges (DIUS, 2008), whilst PVE funding has 
led to 300 new dedicated Police posts nationally, some of them attached to the 
newly-established Regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs). This all added up to a 
2008-2011 PVE budget of £140 million, some £85 million of which came from the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and the security-
focussed remainder from the Home Office. 
 
Pressure came on Local Authorities through the Local Area Agreements under the 
Common Spending Assessment to adopt ‘National Indicator 35’ around developing 
‘resilience to violent extremism’; some Local Authorities refused to adopt it initially, 
but all were required to report on it to Government Offices (LGA, 2008).Many Local 
Authorities have remained deeply anxious about PVE (Turley, 2009). However, 
pressure from government saw PVE continue to grow to the point where all Local 
Authorities with significant Muslim communities were involved, although a number of 
Muslim community groups refused to participate (House of Commons, 2010). 
PVE has to be understood within the wider context of broader anti-terrorism policies. 
The Initial CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2003), subsequently updated by 
CONTEST 2 (Home Office, 2009), outlined four distinct but inter-related elements: 
Pursue, Prevent (PVE), Protect and Prepare. Government has acknowledged that, in 
the original strategy , ‘Prevent’ was the least developed element, and it has 
subsequently been prioritised (House of Commons, 2010).Here, PVE can be 
understood as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach aimed at people seen as vulnerable to 
persuasion to support terrorists and who might ‘reject and undermine our shared 
values and jeopardise community cohesion’ (Home Office, 2009:15).Such a 
prioritisation of community engagement within the overall strategy acknowledges that 
, ‘Intelligence is the most vital element in successful counter-terrorism’ (English, 
2009:131).This approach focuses both on increasing the resilience  and addressing 
the grievances of communities, and on identifying vulnerable individuals, as well as 
challenging and disrupting ideologies sympathetic to violent extremism (Home 
Office, 2009). Here, ‘resilience’ can be understood as resisting the appeal of, or even 
standing up, to extremist political activity and terrorist recruitment attempts within 
Muslim communities. Largely operationalised through education and welfare-based 
state organisations, and through support for community organisations, PVE can be 
seen as a relatively restrained and preventative anti-terrorism approach in 
comparison to other western states facing a similar threat both now , and in the 
recent past (Gupta, 2008) 
A summary of PVE activities funded by the initial ‘Pathfinder’ pilot year (DCLG, 2008) 
claimed that over 44,000 people, almost all of them Muslim youths taking part in 
broad and unfocussed activities, had been engaged with nationally, but admitted that 
little independent evaluation had taken place. An exception was Kirklees in West 
Yorkshire (home of two of the 7/7 bombers), where independent evaluation identified 
a lack of clarity over the aims of the well-meaning work and its relationship to 
community cohesion (Thomas, 2008). The national expansion of PVE did lead to 
new guidance over evaluation approaches, but this was confined to vague 
suggestions that Local Authorities ‘might’ decide to develop external evaluation of 
programmes (DCLG, 2009a). The significant evidence generated through the 
Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry in to PVE (House of Commons, 2009;2010) 
highlighted how difficult it is to quantify ‘success’, especially if this is seen as a longer 
term approach rather than concerned with the prevention of terrorist plots now. 
Indeed, oral evidence to the Inquiry from the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) suggested that PVE represented a ‘generational’ struggle to influence young 
Muslims (House of Commons, 2010). That Inquiry process acknowledged that PVE 
had enabled stronger relationships between Local Authorities and Muslim 
communities in some areas, had strengthened the organisation and transparency of 
some Muslim community organisations, promoted the voices of women and young 
people within community processes, and had highlighted the need for more open 
debates within Muslim communities around the causes of domestic violent 
extremism. However, it concluded that the impact of the problems and contradictions 
of PVE outweighed any positive impacts, and so called for significant re-shaping of 
the programme (House of Commons, 2010). 
This article now goes on to identify and explore the key problems of PVE. They are, 
firstly, that PVE has focussed on Muslim communities only, a broad and 
monocultural approach that has proven counterproductive. Secondly, that this 
monocultural focus has been a vehicle for surveillance and intelligence –gathering by 
Police and Security services, so antagonising the very communities that PVE is 
trying to win over. This focus on Muslims is in stark contradiction to wider 
government priorities of Community Cohesion, and may well be having damaging 
consequences as a result. Finally, the actual design and implementation of PVE has 
led to very significant tension between government departments at national level, 
and between different agencies at a local level. 
 
An unhelpful Muslim focus? 
From the start, PVE has focussed on Muslim communities, and particularly on young 
Muslims. This focus might appear self-evident given the serious Islamist threat 
faced, but it is argued here that this focus, and the way that it has been framed and 
operationalised, has been damagingly counter-productive.  Of concern here is the 
impact PVE has had on Government’s relationships with and standing in the nation’s 
varied Muslim communities, both in focusing solely on them, and in the manner in 
which it has been conducted, with the suggestion that PVE has represented clumsy 
attempts at ‘social engineering’ through a ‘values-based’ (Birt, 2009) approach that 
has had a negative impact by-enforcing the otherness of Muslim communities. This 
section first outlines how PVE has focussed solely on Muslim communities, and then 
discusses the tensions generated by how this has been operationalised.  
 
Whilst the terrorist bombings and other plots quoted above are clearly serious, they 
have involved very small numbers of individuals. This was apparently acknowledged 
by government in introducing PVE: ’There has always been a tiny minority who 
oppose tolerance and diversity’ (DCLG, 2007b:2), but the same document baldly 
stated that ’the key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes 
among Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007b:7). This impression that Government was concerned 
with Muslim communities in general was confirmed by the broad brush targeting of 
PVE funding at all significant Muslim communities even though there is no evidence 
from plots to date that terrorists are more likely to emerge from ‘dense’ Muslim 
communities (Finney and Simpson, 2009).Whilst a number of DCLG PVE documents 
talk about extremism in other communities, 
 ’We have been unable, however, to document any practical Prevent work in the 
community that is not directed in some way at Muslim communities, and we have 
been unable to find any examples of work that focuses substantially on far-right 
extremism’ (Kundnani, 2009:24). 
  
This   focus on Muslims per se is also highlighted by the large-scale engagement 
with Muslim young people (DCLG, 2008), and the clear emphasis of Muslim 
community capacity building of civic infrastructure locally (Thomas, 2008) and 
nationally (DCLG, 2009b), such as enhanced training and support for Mosque 
schools. The nature of this PVE engagement with Muslim communities has proved 
controversial. Shortly after the 7/7  bombings, the Government established seven 
working groups under the collective title ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET), 
whilst also establishing the Commission on Cohesion and Integration (DCLG, 
2007c), whose subsequent report re-energised many of the original Community 
Cohesion recommendations (Cantle, 2001) . The PET process had significant 
Muslim involvement, and ranged across issues of economic, social and educational 
experiences, creating an expectation that it would lead to an explicit focus on 
‘Muslim’ disadvantage (Kundnani, 2009). In fact, Government was already focussed 
on educational and economic social exclusion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin 
young people and communities (SEU, 2001), so, arguably addressing underlying 
root problems (English, 2009), but showed no inclination to integrate this as an 
explicitly holistic Muslim policy initiative. As a result, PVE emerged the following year 
as an agenda concerned with radicalisation, and issues of ‘values’ and community 
organisation that might be contributing to it (DCLG, 2007a). 
In this way, PVE has offered Muslim community organisations funding for capacity 
building through an explicitly anti-terrorism agenda. The labelling of an entire 
community as susceptible to terrorist involvement that is arguably inherent in this 
approach is exacerbated by the way government has gone about this. Birt (2009) 
identifies a tension in government’s approach between ‘values based’ and ‘means 
based’ strategies, with the pragmatism of the ‘means-based’ approach being 
sidelined by an inherently judgemental and interventionist ‘values-based approach’. 
The former sees Islamist terrorism in the UK as largely a socio-political phenomenon 
and so focuses on the personal and political factors attracting some young Muslim 
men to radicalisation, and engages with groups and individuals who can work 
constructively with such young men. This approach is favoured by professional 
practitioners on the ground being asked to operationalise PVE, including the 
Metropolitan Police’s ‘Muslim Contact Unit, which has worked constructively with 
Islamist groups who dislike British society but who vehemently oppose violence (Birt, 
2009), and is supported by strong empirical evidence (University of Central 
Lancashire, 2009). However, the ‘values’ based’ approach has dominated 
government’s view of PVE and the way they have shaped it nationally. It has 
arguably given the impression that government is overtly intervening to shape 
religious practice and to promote new types of community leadership within Muslim 
communities.  This ‘values-based’ understanding sees a problem with the way Islam 
itself is being understood and practised by many second and third generation 
Muslims, leading to a need to promote and develop a more moderate and 
progressive British Islam (Birt, 2009). Whilst President Obama has initiated a move 
in the US towards the ‘means-based’ approach, the British government has gone the 
other way since the 2006 airliners plot towards the ‘values-based’ approach through 
PVE, an approach confirmed by recent refinements: ‘As part of CONTEST 2, the 
revised Prevent strategy reflects this shift in emphasis and works out its rationale in 
greater detail’ (Birt, 2009:54). One approach has been to fund new organisations, 
promoting them as the voice of modern and moderate British Islam. This approach 
has seen The Quillam Foundation (2009), headed by ex-Islamist radical Ed Husain 
(2007) receive over £1 million, the Sufi Muslim Council over £200,000 and the 
Radical Middle Way almost £400,000 (Kundnani, 2009). This has been supported by 
explicit guidance to Local Authorities and others receiving PVE funding to prioritise 
work with Muslim women and young people as under-represented voices and 
experiences within Muslim communities (DCLG, 2007b;2009b). Together, this can 
be seen as an attempt by government to engineer different types of leadership and 
representation from Muslim communities, with the assumption that this will lead to 
more progressive attitudes, values and behaviour. This has been supported by 
withdrawal of funding and engagement with national umbrella Muslim organisations, 
such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), not seen as taking a sufficiently robust 
enough position against Islamist terrorism at home or abroad. Ironically, the MCB’s 
formation and development in the 1990s was encouraged by both Conservative and 
Labour governments as a clear national voice for ‘moderate’ Muslims, even though 
the MCB was always led by Islamist activists whose overtly political perspectives 
were at odds with the vast majority of practising British Muslims (McRoy, 2006). The 
MCB had considerable success in lobbying for state support for Muslim faith schools 
and more policy focus on religious affiliation (such as a question on faith in the 2001 
Census), but their relationship with government came under increasing strain as the 
‘values-based’ approach became predominant, with contact cut over the pro-Hamas 
views of an MCB leader (McRoy, 2006). This government’s  attempt to create a new 
generation and type of ‘community leaders’ can be seen as a parallel of policy 
approaches to ethnic minority communities in the wake of serious urban 
disturbances in the early 1980s (Kundnani, 2009), and has clearly provoked 
resentment from more established Muslim community groups (House of Commons, 
2009). 
Ironically, the PVE funding approach  has sometimes resulted in working with exactly 
the sort of traditional Muslim Community Leaders, many of  them MCB  affiliates that 
the ‘values-based’ l approach has tried to move away from, as evidenced with the 
considerable support for  Mosque Schools (Thomas, 2008; ). At the local level, 
Muslim organisations have often felt that they are being treated as clients and 
service delivers, rather than strategic partners, either playing no role in delivery 
(Thomas, 2008), or having to compete with each other for funding and overtly ‘sign 
up’ to government positions against terrorism (which virtually everyone opposes) and 
‘extremism’ (which no one can agree a definition of). The danger of this ‘values-
based’ approach, and the fact that funding is contingent on its acceptance, is that it 
closes down  the  open debates and involvements needed to undermine the appeal 
of violent extremism: ‘One effect of Prevent is to undermine exactly the kind of 
radical discussions of political issues that would need to occur if young people are to 
be won over and support for illegitimate political violence diminished’ (Kundnani, 
2009:35).Here, in such a broad focus on Muslim communities as a  whole, whilst 
prioritising the acceptance of certain ‘values’, PVE has represented the worst of all 
worlds, approaching an entire faith community  as being at risk of terrorist 
involvement, whilst forcing particular political and doctrinal issues that have only 
limited meaning to most Muslims going about their ordinary, day to day lives. In fact, 
the ruling out under the PVE ‘values-based’ approach of certain legitimately-
established Muslim organisations, would seem to play in to the hands of certain 
Islamist groups, such as Hizb-Ut-Tahir, who demand that Muslims have nothing to 
do with any democratic, secular processes within wider society. For Birt (2009:54), 
the fundamental difficulty of PVE, ‘is an over-emphasis upon counter-terrorism 
without engaging Muslims as citizens, rather than as an ‘at risk’ set of communities’. 
Government spies? 
Perhaps the most heated criticism of PVE has been that its significant growth has 
been cover for the development of surveillance of Muslim communities, with  claims  
that, ‘there is evidence that the Prevent programme has been used to establish one 
of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain’ (Kundnani, 
2009:8). Whilst this has been strongly denied by the government (DCLG, 2009c), 
there has been a very significant growth in Police and Security Service involvement 
in PVE , and, arguably, an associated blurring of roles, between education and 
policing, between security apparatus and  local democratic accountability, and 
between the Prevent and Pursue arms of CONTEST 2 (Home Office, 2009). Such 
blurring of roles is arguably inevitable within a counter-terrorism strategy that 
attempts to include community development aspects as well as policing and security 
functions (English, 2009). The resulting allegations of covert surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering are discussed below, and whilst the actual evidence of them is 
very limited, the impression of it has taken firm hold (House of Commons, 2010), 
fuelled by political campaigning and media coverage (Kundnani, 2009; The 
Guardian, 2009b). 
 
The basis of these claims has been an increased focus on policing, identification of 
threats, and monitoring/information-sharing within the 2008-2011 expansion of the 
PVE programme, with the Home Office ‘providing additional funding to establish over 
three hundred new Police posts across the country dedicated to Prevent’ (DCLG, 
2009b:25), and additional money for Police forces to work with Schools, Universities 
and Colleges on PVE. The context for this has been the establishment in 2007 of the 
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), designed to overcome cross-
departmental confusion, and the resulting development of Counter Terrorism Units, 
to which some of these new Police posts have been attached. This has been 
mirrored by the security service MI5 developing regional offices for the first time. 
These very significant policing and security developments have fuelled fears of 
surveillance for some, and prompted conflicts around power, information and 
appropriate roles at a local level. The reality of Police officers playing prominent roles 
in local Prevent boards, ‘has raised questions of police interference in the political 
relationships between Local Authorities and Muslim communities’ (Birt , 
2009:8).Indeed, some agencies feel that the Police are actually in charge of this 
supposedly ‘hearts and minds’ programme at the local level:  
The police are such key drivers at a local level together with your counterterrorism 
officers and the intelligence services, they become the funnel through which what is 
happening in the community is funnelled back to the government... it is the police 
who are leading the agenda (Lachman, 2009). 
This is confirmed by Birmingham City Council (2009), the largest single recipient of 
PVE funding nationally: ‘Our delivery plan utilises intelligence from West Midlands 
Police (e.g. Counter-Terrorism local profile) in order to target funding and provision 
as necessary ‘.  Critics (Kundnani, 2009:6)  identify growing concerns from both 
Muslim community organisations and public sector professionals that involvement in 
PVE required them to pass on information to the police, whilst at the same time, 
Local Authorities felt that information flows within PVE were one way only, with them 
expected to pass intelligence on, but CTUs and  Police not willing to pass anything 
the other way, often claiming that Local Authority Chief Executives did not have the 
right ‘clearance’ (Turley, 2009). Arguably, these concerns demonstrate a naivety 
about the way community interaction and security aspects of counter-terrorism 
strategies will inevitably interact, as the Northern Ireland experience indicates 
(English, 2009). This misunderstanding has perhaps been unhelpfully fuelled by the 
PVE label being used for such a wide range of policy functions (House of Commons, 
2010). 
This fear of surveillance has been heightened by the ‘greater involvement of Police 
officers in education-based PVE activities that would be normally seen as the 
territory of youth and community workers:  
A significant part of the prevent programme is the embedding of counter-terrorism 
police officers within the delivery of other local services. The implication of teachers 
and youth, community and cultural workers in information-sharing undercuts 
professional norms of confidentiality (Kundnani, 2009:28). 
 The argument here is not that the Police do not have a legitimate counter-terrorism 
role to play but whether that such an overt involvement in funding and monitoring 
PVE activity, and increasingly even delivering it to young people and community 
groups, is effective, or rather whether it is counter-productive through the unhelpful 
blurring of professional roles and their proper boundaries. Local Authorities clearly 
feel that this Police involvement has unhelpfully blurred the distinction between 
‘Prevent’ (education and community development-based activity) and ‘Pursue’ 
(necessary surveillance and policing interventions) with this having a 
counterproductive effect: ‘there is a danger that the levels of suspicion and mistrust 
around Prevent could be used as a tool by those elements who seek to undermine 
cohesion’ (Turley, 2009:12). 
The more recent development of the ‘Channel’ initiative within PVE is seen as 
progress at the local level.  Channel works with much smaller numbers of ‘at risk’ 
young people identified through multi-agency partnership mechanisms, and utilises 
both diversionary and de-radicalisation approaches, tailored to the individual (House 
of Commons, 2010). However, this may well simply be a smaller scale surveillance 
or ‘fishing expedition’ in that there is little  evidence as to how those genuinely at risk 
of involvement in ‘violent extremism’ can be identified in advance, so casting doubt 
over the whole role of and significant resource allocation to the Police within PVE. 
Despite very close government investigation of those Britons to date involved in 
Islamist terror plots,’ the security services can identify neither a uniform pattern by 
which a process occurs nor a particular type that is susceptible’ (Bux, 2007:269).The 
danger here is that ‘fact’ based profiles of susceptibility underestimate the process of 
relationships and peer group operation that can tip individuals towards violence, and 
that predicting this in advance is very difficult. Clearly, high levels of vigilance are 
needed against further Islamist terror plots, but the question here is whether crude 
focus on Muslim communities as a whole, steered overtly by the Police and security 
forces in an effort to ‘spot’ likely terrorists will really be effective, or may even be 
counter-productive because of the suspicions and distrust this approach engenders 
amongst ordinary Muslims. The term ‘hearts and minds’ originates in counter-
insurgency campaigns and was based on isolating insurgents through winning the 
support and trust of the majority (English, 2009). On that basis, the success or 
otherwise of PVE is unclear, as the appearance and partial reality of state 
surveillance that is central to its operationalisation has seriously damaged the 
prospect of community partnership. In contrast, moving towards community 
cohesion- based approach ‘would create the space and legitimacy for a more 
sophisticated, intelligence-led approach to tackling specific local threats as and when 
they occur’ (Turley, 2009:22). Such an approach would suggest a clear separation 
between policing and cohesion-based community development activities, as 
highlighted by the overwhelming majority of submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry 
(House of Commons, 2009) and their subsequent recommendations (House of 
Commons, 2010). 
At odds with wider policies? 
Whilst the criticisms of PVE discussed above are significant, arguably the most 
fundamental problem with PVE has been its lack of congruence with key 
governmental policy priorities, in particular Community Cohesion. This section 
discusses that tension, by focussing on how PVE conflicts with Cohesion. The 
Introduction highlighted the extent to which race relations policy approaches shifted 
markedly after the 2001 urban disturbances towards Community Cohesion (Cantle, 
2001; Home Office, 2005). Central to the Community Cohesion thesis was the view 
that past policy approaches had hardened ethnic segregation and   negatively 
impacted on attempts to create genuine integration and shared identities (Cantle, 
2005, ). Whilst highly contested (Flint and Robinson, 2008), there is clear evidence 
that Community Cohesion has been understood and supported by educational 
practitioners (Thomas, 2007). This meant that the explicitly monocultural focus of 
PVE was immediately identified at ground  level, , as problematically at odds with 
Community Cohesion (Thomas, 2008).Government were adamant that PVE, ‘is not 
the same as a wider concern for community cohesion’ (DCLG, 2007b:2),but 
consistently struggled to clarify this distinction. 
 
One of the key conclusions of Community Cohesion in relation to the 2001 
disturbances was that ethnic tension had built up in towns such as Oldham because 
of funding schemes targeted at specific ethnic and geographical communities (often 
the same thing in a reality of ethnic housing segregation) and the associated myth 
that some (ethnic) communities were being favoured over others (Ritchie, 2001). 
This led to an emphasis, reinforced by the recommendations (DCLG, 2007c) that 
policy and funding should work across ethnic groups, so building shared identities. 
The design and implementation of PVE has been in clear contradiction to that 
approach and has had the predictable results of creating suspicion, competitive 
claims, and ‘virulent envy’ (Birt, 2009) from other ethnic minority faith groups envious 
of the very considerable government support for Muslim faith organisations and 
infrastructure, (House of Commons, 2010),  whilst vehemently denying that their 
faiths have any problems with ‘extremism’. A more worrying envy comparison has 
come from certain white communities, particularly those white working class 
communities who have been marginalised by post-industrial restructuring and the 
dominant neo-liberal political responses to it (Byrne, 1999). A ‘white backlash’ 
(Hewitt, 2005) against the implementation of anti-racist measures, and the fact that 
such perceptions contributed to urban unrest (Cantle, 2001; Ritchie, 2001) had 
already been identified and Community Cohesion was meant to offer a holistic 
solution. However, it far from clear how much that new vision has been 
operationalised, judging by the monocultural focus of PVE. The result has been two- 
way envy and resentment, with Muslim communities asking why ‘extremism’, 
including its violent political form of far-right activists, was not being addressed in 
some white communities, whilst non-Muslims questioned why such significant public 
resources were being directed towards often bland and generalised youth and 
community activities for Muslims only. The growing political strength of the British 
National party, , did lead government to establish a ‘Connecting Communities’ fund 
(DCLG, 2009c) ,aimed at certain white working class areas , in practice witnessing 
far-right-related political tensions, but described by DCLG as being ‘communities 
under pressure’. However, despite the impression created, this fund was not part of 
PVE, and had modest resources attached to it. 
 
This policy expansion to white areas was accompanied by explicit guidance by CLG 
Minister John Denham that, ‘cross-community activities could form a legitimate part 
of Prevent activities’ and the promise of money to support it (DCLG, 2009c). Both 
these initiatives go some way to answer the criticisms of PVE outlined above, and 
Denham also explicitly refuted the allegations of PVE as surveillance of Muslim 
communities, or as an attempt to change the values and leadership of Muslim 
communities. However, the amendments to the Muslim-only focus of PVE were 
minor at best, and the interpretation of purpose by Denham suggested more 
questions than answers. For Denham, PVE, ‘is a crime prevention programme’, and 
that a distinction from cohesion needs to be maintained:  
 
Community Cohesion – building a strong society with shared values and a strong 
sense of shared identity – is a broader and more ambitious aim, involving every part 
of every community equally, not just the Muslim communities. Prevent needs to 
remain focussed on preventing crime (DCLG, 2009c).  
 
Whilst addressing discussions around surveillance and political interference, this 
crime prevention formulation, is highly problematic for two reasons. Firstly, assuming 
the ‘crime’ to be prevented is terrorist activity, why has PVE activity worked with such 
large numbers of Muslim young people, yet focussed so little on political , social and 
individual/psychological factors likely to make at least some young Muslims at risk of 
being involved in violent extremism? The evaluation evidence available suggests 
that engagement with such issues has been studiously avoided for a number of 
reasons, leaving PVE activity as bland and generalised youth activities for Muslims 
only (DCLG, 2008; Thomas, 2008, 2009). Crime Prevention youth activities, have 
worked with smaller numbers of carefully-targeted young people, often referred by 
relevant agencies. The ‘Channel’ programme has worked with 200-300 young 
people to date (ACPO, 2009), and would seem to fit the ‘crime prevention’ 
understanding well, but the broader PVE activity to date simply doesn’t fit any 
meaningful understanding of that concept. Secondly, it avoids discussion of how the 
monocultural approach of PVE discussed above may actually be re-enforcing the 
likelihood of some young Muslims being attracted to violent extremism. The 
Community Cohesion analysis of ethnic relations in Britain (Cantle, 2001) was 
precisely that ‘parallel lives’ had encouraged tensions between communities, and 
separate, oppositional identities. This reality has been confirmed by more recent 
research amongst young people in Oldham and Rochdale, Greater Manchester, with 
significant numbers of white and Muslim young men having highly prejudiced and 
antagonistic attitudes towards ‘others’ (Thomas and Sanderson, 2009). Denham 
(DCLG, 2009c) focussed on how building resilience against extremism amongst 
Muslim communities was a key aim of this ‘crime prevention’ PVE policy, but 
arguably you cannot build resilience against intolerance and racism without 
individuals and their communities having the confidence, skills and links, the 
‘bridging social capital’ (Putnam, 2000), or cross-community links, that comes from 
meaningful and ongoing cross-ethnic contact. Indeed, Denham himself said in the 
Government’s response to the 2001 urban disturbances that the areas of the country 
not experiencing racial tensions were those who had ‘succeeded in uniting diverse 
groups through a shared sense of belonging to, and pride in, a common civic identity’ 
(Denham, 2001:11). The Government’s consistent defence of why a PVE policy 
separate to Community Cohesion is needed is that terrorists can emerge from 
cohesive communities, with the ACPO (2009) supporting this because of, ‘the fact 
that the four suicide bombers in 2005 were nurtured in cohesive communities’. 
However, this is simply not true – three of the bombers grew up in the highly-
ethnically-segregated and racially tense Leeds suburb of Beeston, an area which fits 
the theory of ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001) From that perspective, attractions to 
violent extremism whether radical Islamist or racist white extremism, are likely to be 
stronger in isolated and monocultural communities where ethnic segregation and 
singular identities are the norm (Thomas, 2009). yet PVE has done exactly that, work 
with Muslims only, thereby giving the message that their Muslim faith is the only form 
of identity and experience that is of importance.  
 
Problematic policy design? 
Over and above the fundamental flaws and contradictions of PVE that have been 
explored above, there have been a number of problematic features of the way that 
the policy has been organised, and implemented. These have included misleading 
titles, a lack of meaningful evaluation, significant tensions between central and local 
government, and, tensions between different parts of central government over the 
proper focus for PVE activity. The disquiet from Muslim community groups over the 
focus of PVE and worries from local government around the lack of congruence with 
community cohesion, both discussed above, have led central government to connive 
in the use of misleading titles without any fundamental changes to PVE. Local 
evaluation of the initial phase of PVE (Thomas, 2008) found the bland title of 
‘Pathfinder’ being used, whilst government formally dropped ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’: ’This term is no longer used to describe that funding‘(DCLG, 2009b:34), 
in favour of the enigmatic ‘Prevent’. This was in recognition of the fact that many 
Muslims felt stigmatised as potential terrorists by the PVE title. More serious has 
been the lack of independent and robust evaluation, with few exceptions (Thomas, 
2008; University of Central Lancashire, 2009).Whilst government seemed relaxed 
over the need for such evaluation (DCLG, 2009a),  ACPO  (2009) acknowledge the 
effects of this absence: ‘the apparent lack of evaluation of Prevent initiatives has 
made the ‘value for money’ assessment of Prevent difficult’.  
 
It is likely that such evaluation would reveal significant disparities between what 
central government has claimed for PVE and the reality of much of its operation on 
the ground. Consistent with wider Labour policy approaches, PVE was supposedly a 
locally-determined policy but has been strongly driven from the centre through use of 
NI35 and monitoring/pressure from local Government Offices. Despite substantial 
initial misgivings (Thomas, 2008), Local Authorities have formally co-operated, but in 
practice have demonstrated a wide range of responses. A small minority, some of 
which have received very substantial funding, have been vociferous in their support 
for PVE (Birmingham City Council, 2009) but a large number seem to have 
subverted the funding to a significant extent, ‘many statutory and community 
partners have been uncomfortable with direct counter-terrorism work and have 
sought to employ the funds for other ends’ (Birt, 2009:54). The result, as discussed 
above, has usually been bland and unfocussed youth activities (Thomas, 
2008;DCLG, 2008), with the Association of Police Authorities (APA) (2009) 
commenting that, ‘many Police Authorities question whether, in practice, there is any 
real difference between Prevent and community cohesion’. The problem here, 
though, has been that this activity is monocultural and so ineffective in terms of 
cohesion, just as it has little demonstrable focus on factors and issues likely to lead 
some individuals towards violent extremism. For APA, the solution is a tighter focus 
on Muslim ‘extremism’, with some recent evidence that Police influence is being 
used to block PVE support for more general youth activities (Birt, 2009). 
What this reality on the ground exposes is the biggest tension within PVE – the 
tension between the two government departments delivering PVE, DCLG and the 
Home Office. Each department has contributed some of the overall budget, with 
DCLG ‘owning’ some of the PVE strategy objectives, whilst OSCT/Home Office ‘own’ 
the others (APA, 2009). This might not be problematic in itself, but it is clear that the 
operationalisation of PVE has been built on real inter-departmental tensions over 
purpose and priority, as identified by the Local Government Association (2009): 
’Tension between OSCT and CLG on the nature of the focus of Prevent, and the 
activity which should flow from that, can be a problem at times’, with lack of 
consistency identified as a result.   It is clear that a ‘turf war’, something far from new 
in the history of counter-terrorism policies (English, 2009), has been taking place, 
based on significantly different views of effective ways forward:  
We in local government support John Denham’s view of Prevent as distinct but 
necessarily situated within the broader context of community cohesion and 
equalities...Police and the security services will necessarily see things from a 
different perspective....these messages need to be properly aligned across 
government(LGA, 2009).  
From this perspective, the very limited and nuanced changes in PVE (DCLG , 2009c) 
discussed above can actually be understood as hard-won concessions in the right 
direction by a Minister with a clear track record of support for Community Cohesion 
(Denham, 2001), and the Inquiry by the CLG Select Committee (House of 
Commons, 2009; 2010) as an attempt to bolster and support those moves, whilst the 
Home Office ‘arm’ of PVE have demanded more robust scrutiny and surveillance of, 
and judgements on, Muslim communities and organisations (APA, 2009). This 
suggests that PVE as it stands has few friends even within government, with both 
DCLG and the Home Office profoundly dissatisfied with it, but for very different 
reasons, so introducing instability in local policy design and delivery. 
 
Conclusion: A policy agenda with a future? 
The problems, contradictions and limitations of the PVE policy agenda discussed 
above arguably leave Britain in a worrying impasse. It is beyond dispute that Britain 
faces a very serious, largely home-grown Islamist terror threat, one that shows few 
signs of diminishing in the foreseeable future (Home Office, 2009). Whilst particular 
foreign policy initiatives may have played an accelerant role for this threat, there is 
clear evidence that it pre-dates the Iraq War and even the 9/11 attacks, having its 
roots in profound global economic, technological, geo-political and religious 
developments (Burke, 2007). This article has attempted to address the issue of 
whether the government’s PVE initiative (DCLG, 2007a) has been a helpful 
contribution or not to increasing Britain’s resilience, safety and security against this 
terrorist threat. Its conclusion has been that there are profound problems and 
limitations with the PVE agenda to date, a view echoed by the Parliamentary Inquiry 
in to the portion of PVE overseen by DCLG (House of Commons, 2009; 2010). In 
summarising these criticisms, this final section also attempts to suggest the more 
positive ways forward that are implicit in the criticism of what has gone before. 
 
It first has to be acknowledged that the education and community-based approach of 
PVE within the overall CONTEST (Home Office, 2009) counter-terrorism strategy 
represents a patient and balanced approach when compared to the current and 
historic approaches of other states when facing a domestic terrorist threat (English, 
2009; Gupta, 2008). A strategy based purely on policing and security approaches 
might well have exacerbated considerably the concerns expressed here. Indeed, this 
flawed but  arguably constructive British approach of PVE needs to be viewed in the 
light of the regressive re-thinking of national attitudes and approaches to Muslim 
communities per se in previously liberal European states like the Netherlands 
(Sneiderman and Hagendorn, 2009). 
Nevertheless, it is hard to be positive about PVE to date, with the tensions inherent 
in its design and implementation leading to it ‘falling between two stools’ (Thomas, 
2009).This is not due to a lack of resources, as significant resources have been 
allocated to a range of Local Authorities, community groups and criminal justice 
agencies. Instead, the concerns are about the monocultural and arguably counter-
productive focus on Muslim communities, and on how this must be seen as an 
inexplicable contradiction to the post-2001 policy direction of Community Cohesion, 
(Cantle, 2001) which has prioritised shared identities as a way of overcoming racial 
tension and the appeal of oppositional identities. In contradicting that overarching 
governmental policy goal, PVE has predictably created envy and suspicion from 
other communities, whilst also damaging relations with Muslim communities through 
a clumsy ‘values-based’ approach of social engineering (Birt, 2009), and often failing 
to actually engage with key political and religious issues that may be driving support 
for ‘violent extremism’ (Thomas, 2008;2009). Further, the very significant 
involvement  of the Police and Security Services within  the wide range of PVE 
activity has created fears of surveillance (Kundnani, 2009), and real damage to 
relationships on the ground between Muslim communities and their Local Authorities 
and Police forces (Turley, 2009; LGA, 2009). These local tensions around funding, 
purpose and responsibility have been exacerbated by inter-departmental tensions 
within national government over the focus and role of PVE, a political impasse 
between cohesion-focussed engagement and security-focussed monitoring and 
intervention that has ruled out significant changes to PVE (LGA, 2009; DCLG, 
2009c). This has resulted in an arguably well-intentioned ‘hearts and minds’ 
approach that has attempted to get to the roots of home-grown Islamist terrorism, 
rather than simply repressing it (Gupta, 2008), being friendless, with neither 
governmental department at the national level, or Local Authorities and the Police at 
local level, satisfied with PVE as it stands, and many Muslim communities 
suspicious, rather than enthusiastically embracing it (Birt, 2009). This friendlessness 
has extended to the other main political parties, who have sharply criticised PVE and 
suggested that they would re-orientate it (Guardian 2009a; 2009b), whilst also 
expressing precisely the contradictory perspectives that have arguably hobbled PVE 
to date (Neville-Jones, 2009). 
 
Whether PVE has also failed is a harder question to answer, partly because of the 
difficulty in identifying what can be termed success for an education and community-
based focus on the communities and areas that Islamist terrorist might emerge from. 
The necessary lack of public knowledge about foiled terrorist plots (Home Office, 
2009) means that the number of terror incidents, or plots leading to convictions, or 
indeed the lack of them, cannot be used a meaningful indicator. What is clear is that 
if building resilience against terrorism and maintaining credibility for governmental 
attempts to oppose it (English, 2009) within Muslim communities is the measure, 
then the Muslim suspicion of, and resentment towards, PVE (Birt, 2009; Kundnani, 
2009) is a highly negative indicator, as is the clear and widespread public criticism of 
PVE’s lack of congruence with efforts to develop Community Cohesion and positive 
cross-community relations (House of Commons, 2010). These criticisms point 
possible ways forward. Enhanced Community Cohesion activity, alongside a public 
acknowledgement that, rightly or wrongly, the PVE name and monocultural approach 
has not gained traction with the key communities it focuses on, could provide a way 
to move forward that avoids stigmatising or scrutinising particular communities, but 
which nevertheless challenges communities to debate and take action against 
‘extremism’ of all kinds. A good example of the way forward here is the British Youth 
Parliament ‘Project Safe Space’ initiative, where young people of all ethnic 
backgrounds have come together around the country to debate what attracts some 
people to extremism and violence, and what can be done to address it. Such 
sessions have involved dialogue between politicians, academics and Police officers 
with young people, often directly confronting highly controversial issues like suicide 
bombing in robust but controlled conditions (House of Commons, 2010). Whilst such 
cohesion-based PVE approaches cannot guarantee safety against further terrorist 
outrages – no ‘hearts and minds’ approach can do that – they would help to remove 
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